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Abstract
This paper attempts to review the features of power relationship 
between central and local governments in Indonesia since the 
early independence up to the post Suharto regime. Its central 
aims are to cast light on the issue of why Indonesia thought that 
decentralisation is necessary; and how the controversy between 
the so-called ideological vs technical orientation has emerged 
since the very beginning (early independent). Overall, I would 
like to argue that even though the answer to the question of 
whether the Indonesian decentralisation and regional autonomy 
policies have actually managed to save the nation-state is still 
contested, the introduction of both concept and policy reforms  
in the post Suharto’s period  have, to some extent, reduced the 
region dissatisfaction upon the centre, and have opened up the 
political space for citizen participation in policy making process, 
and in governing their own communities. What the Indonesian 
should do in the near future is to put decentralisation on the right 
track and to prevent that of on-going democratic decentralisation 
process from the central government desire “to bring the centralised 
power back in”.
I. Introduction
From a political perspective, the word decentralisation has 
1 Author is a senior researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), 
completed his Master Leading to PhD at the Department of Asian Studies, 
Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia (1999).
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126 been used to express the mechanism by which central government 
devolve its power to local governments. This kind of mechanism is 
called political decentralisation. Parsons (1961), for example, defines 
decentralisation as sharing part of the governmental power by a 
central ruling group with other groups, each having authority within 
a specific area of the state. Elsewhere, Mawhood (1987) strongly 
argues that decentralisation is “devolution” of power from central to 
local government. The same tone of definition has also been pursued 
by Smith (1985) who says that decentralisation is the delegation of 
power, from top level to lower level, in a territorial hierarchy, which 
could be one of government within a state, or offices within a large 
organisation. 
Exploring the concept and practice of central-local governmental 
power relationship remains important for a number of reasons. 
Amongst other things, it has theoretically been believed that the 
power sharing between central and local governments is to become 
the main element of the decentralisation concept. In other words, 
the extent to which power has been dispersed by central government 
to local governments would eventually determine the features of 
decentralisation and regional autonomy exercised by a country.
In Indonesia, on 1 January 2001, perhaps the most radical 
decentralisations policies anywhere during the last fifty years were set 
in motion. The authority over all government services, but religious 
affairs and the “federal four” (finances, foreign affairs, defence 
and justice), were transferred to cities and districts, providing far 
reaching regional autonomy. It was done just two years after the first 
democratic president for forty years was elected, after more than 
three decades of highly centralised and authoritarian rule. It was a 
period of deep economic crisis (IDR had devaluated by 400 percent), 
political uncertainties (the first president Abdurrahman Wahid was 
forced to resign after less than two years, replaced by president 
Megawati Sukarno Putri), widespread corruption (according to 
recent studies, Indonesia is the most corrupt country in Asia), and 
ethnic and religious violence (East Timor, Maluku, Papua, Aceh, to 
name but the most well-known). It is a huge on-going experiment 
like few others. 
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In this paper, I will try to put the decentralisation process in 
its political and legal context, and discuss some of the problems of 
implementing such massive politicising. In doing so, the discussion 
will begin with reviewing the nature of decentralisation during 
Indonesia’s Old Order, and then proceed to an outline of the same 
issue during Suharto’s New Order government. The latest debates 
concerning the concept and the practice of decentralisation and 
regional autonomy in contemporary Indonesia will be delineated in 
the last section of this paper.
II. During the Old Order Period
J.D. Legge (1963) is known as one of the foremost observers 
who had explored the nature of central-local government relationship 
in Indonesia after its independence. In his book, Central Authority 
and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 
1950-60, Legge transparently envisages how Indonesia faced 
complicated problems in regard to the formation of adequate local 
governments. Specifically, according to Legge (1963:3), the core 
problems of regionalism in Indonesia is that there is a contradiction 
between the need to satisfy the region and the need to establish a 
stable and strong government. In practice, there was a tendency that 
the need to satisfy the region was countered by the need for strong 
and stable government from the centre.2
The first problem which arose during the provision of local 
government in Indonesia, Legge (1963) insists, was regarding the 
issue of a unitary state. According to the Dutch proposal, only a 
federal constitution would secure justice for the people of an 
independent Indonesia. This argument, of course, was based on the 
fact that Indonesia can hardly be regarded as possessing a natural 
unity, whether in the form of ethnic, social, or economic terms. 
2 In the light of this transformation, Legge contends, that it was a pity that 
Indonesia’s plan for extensive local autonomy within the framework of a unitary 
state should have been presented simply as the republic’s answer to the Dutch 
federal proposal. ..... to regard the idea of decentralization within a framework 
of a unitary state as an alternative to a federal division of powers was to blur 
distinct elements of the problem (1963:9-11). 
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Indonesia, and was followed by the establishment of the United 
State of Indonesia (RIS—Republik Indonesia Serikat). However, in 
the early part of the 1950s, the federal state was transformed into a 
unitary state.3
The most crucial problem arose during the provision of local 
government in Indonesia was in line with the essence of regional 
autonomy itself. According to Legge (1963: 13), the essence of 
regional autonomy in Indonesia is likely to be the amalgam of 
central government’s need to satisfy the regional feelings and the 
need to provide general government. As a result, it was common 
that the notion of regional autonomy in Indonesia went alongside 
the emerging issues of supervision of local government, the extent of 
powers to be enjoyed by local government, and the issue concerning 
the character of the lower level of local government (1963:19).
Overall, there are at least three significant points that can be 
noted from Legge’s analysis. Firstly, Legge demonstrated obviously 
that, to some degree, the problem of establishing an adequate local 
government in Indonesia has a close relationship with the form of 
the state itself (unitary state). In this sense, it is asserted that it was 
unlikely for Indonesia to achieve an extensive regional autonomy 
system within the framework of a unitary state, because there is a 
great diversity among the regions in Indonesia, either in the form of 
ethnicity, religions, culture, or economic resources. This circumstance 
appears to be a more serious matter when it is related to the historical 
background of local government in Indonesia during the Dutch 
occupation, in which there was also diversity in the form of local 
government, especially between Western and Eastern Indonesia 
3 Among these three crucial issues, Legge writes, the existence of ‘supervising’ 
local governments seems to be the core point. This is because when the central 
government planned to surrender its power to local government; at the same 
time it would undoubtedly go along with the central demand for a solid 
supervisory role over the local authority. Elsewhere, differentiation in characters 
of local governments themselves also suggests the need for a strong supervision 
from the centre. Within this condition, undoubtedly the ideal instrument of 
supervision in the eyes of central government was the ‘pamong praja’ (1963:17).
129
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
(Legge, 1963:17).
Secondly, the controversy over the need to transfer power to local 
governments and the need to extend a strong control has apparently 
emerged since the provision period. There were several methods 
which had been implemented by the central government to restrict 
the authority of local government, such as by placing its officers in 
local areas (pamong praja), appointing the head of local government, 
‘spaying’ the role of Local Representatives (DPRD), and through 
direct control over some particular policy implementation (Legge, 
1963:20-61).
The third significant point from Legge’s study is that even 
though the intervention of central government over the regions 
(during the provision period) remains dominant, to some extent, the 
pressure from local government had been taken into consideration 
by the central administration. This phenomenon can be illustrated, 
for instance, when the Djuanda’s government (April, 1957) had to 
give a response to the local demand for 70% of the foreign exchange 
which they earned. Another instance is in the case of a local complaint 
concerning access to foreign exchange. To respond to this complaint, 
central government established a foreign exchange bureau (BDP—
Biro Devisa Perdagangan) in certain areas which enabled the local 
government to acquire import licenses without going to Jakarta 
(Legge, 1963:236-245).
Another scholar who had explored further the nature of 
decentralisation in Indonesia during the period of 1950s is Gerald 
S. Maryanov (1959). One of the significant points that can be 
underlined from his work is the reason for why Indonesia thought 
that decentralisation was necessary to be implemented. According to 
Maryanov, the main reason for the demand for decentralisation in 
Indonesia is attached to the idea of democracy. Specifically, Maryanov 
(1959:197) contends that, 
The notion of democratic political system has led to the 
expectation that democracy must be the characteristic of 
regional government, and that regional government is part of 
the democratising process. Organisation must be extended to 
the regions, but it must be democratic, accommodating the 
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In exploring further the nature of decentralisation within 
the framework of a unitary state of Indonesia, Maryanov offers a 
distinctive approach. He sees the essence of decentralisation by linking 
this issue to the characteristics of the society’s political life. In this 
sense, Maryanov determines the characteristic of political life as the 
ways in which communication about political matters is formulated 
(1959:340). Based on this determination, Maryanov suggests there 
are three characteristics of national political life in Indonesia, namely 
Expectation vs Reality, Ideological vs Technical Orientation and 
finally the Monopoly of Leadership by the Government (1959:341-
349).
All of these characteristics of national political life, according to 
Maryanov, wrapped up the implementation of decentralization policy 
in Indonesia. In the course of Expectation vs Reality, for instance, 
it was expressed by the high expectation to embody an image of a 
unitary state with stable and functioning units of local government 
exercising their own autonomy. However, these expectations were 
never satisfactorily achieved. Part of the failure has been due to 
unsuitable conditions at the local level (1959:343).
The Ideological vs Technical Orientation have likewise had a 
significant impact upon the implementation of decentralisation. In 
this aspect, Maryanov argues, the ideological orientation involves 
values which are stated theoretically and use abstract ideas, such 
as ‘democracy’. On the other hand, technical orientation is more 
concerned with the implementation of policies rather than with 
the abstract goals. This orientation is usually related to the idea of 
‘efficiency’ (1959:344-346). In respect to the issue of decentralisation, 
‘ideological orientation vs technical orientation’ was expressed by the 
controversy between central and local government over the notion of 
extending regional autonomy. Ideological orientation was represented 
by the regional spokesmen who demanded more autonomy because 
that is what the people wanted. The technical orientation responses 
(most often from the central government) stressed the shortage of 
local governments’ capacity and offered control (1959:349).
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Concerning the third characteristic of national political life—
Government and the Monopoly of Political leadership, it is asserted by 
Maryanov that the most popular characteristic of government in 
Indonesia is marked by the dominant role of the central government 
in determining the development of its society. All societal interests 
are the interests of the government, and the government holds the 
ultimate responsibility for stimulating change—where changes are 
desired for controlling development, such is for occurring, and 
for determining what the society is to become (1959:399). This 
characteristic had also coloured the nature of decentralisation. It was 
demonstrated by the central government’s response to the demands 
for more autonomy. In this sense, the central government claims 
itself as the actor for determining the problem and formulating the 
solution. It is for the central government to decide which regions 
should be granted autonomy, and the degree of authority which 
must be surrendered (Maryanov, 1959:352).
Considering Maryanov’s study, even though the topic was 
decentralisation in Indonesia during the provision period, he offers 
a worthwhile approach to understanding the nature of central-local 
government relations within the framework of a unitary state. He was 
able to formulate three characteristics of national political life within 
the unitary state of Indonesia. Moreover, he was also successful in 
exploring the impact of those three characteristics in relation to the 
implementation of decentralisation. Nevertheless, it may be argued 
that Maryanov’s study has relied heavily on the macro perspective. 
He investigated the existence of decentralisation in Indonesia based 
more on the issue of how national government had initiated and 
executed decentralisation, rather than how the local governments 
themselves—or more precisely the local state actors—have seen 
decentralisation.
III.  During the New Order Period:
First of all, it appears to be necessary to outline briefly the 
“development ideology” of New Order before exploring further how 
decentralisation has been delivered in the country. It is due to the 
notion of decentralisation policy at that time cannot be separated 
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other words, likely, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the existence 
of decentralisation policy in Indonesia during the New Order period, 
to some extent, has been functioned as the ‘vehicle’ of development 
ideology to control the regions (See, Michael Morfit, 1986; Colin 
MacAndrew and Ichlasul Amal, 1993).
One explanation is the well-known fact that, since the inception 
of the New Order regime, the issue of economic development has 
become the core of its commitment. Because of it, some scholars, 
then, tend to determine the New Order as the Development Order. 
Thereby, it is not surprising if the term ‘development order’ has 
flourished in Indonesian literatures, especially when discussing the 
nature of economic development in Indonesia. In this sense, of 
course, the New Order itself decelerated the ‘development order’ 
as its symbol is not merely based on its willingness to accelerate 
development process within the entire society in order to embody 
the social welfare, but also based on consideration that arising this 
issue was to be the best way to do in order to elicit a great political 
support from society.
To carry out its commitment, the New Order has emphasised 
its development programme on economic sector. In doing so, there 
have been several efforts conducted by this regime. In overcoming 
financial problems, for instance, the New Order has opened its door 
for foreign investment since the early of 1969s, and has applied to 
some developed countries to offer their aid through IGGI (then 
subsequently the CGI). Likewise, in the course of development 
planning, the National Development Plan has been created; then, it 
also has been implemented through the Five-Year Development Plan 
(REPELITA) which stand on three basic principles of development 
(Trilogi Pembangunan), namely; Political Stability (Stabilitas 
Politik), Economic Growth (Pertumbuhan Ekonomi), and Equity 
(Pemerataan).
The REPELITA has been executed since the early of 1969s. In 
funding this programme, it was much supported by government 
revenue from oil exports (in particularly during the oil boom decade), 
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and foreign assistance. Through these sources of finance, the central 
government has been able to allocate a great national development 
budget to provinces. Due to this remarkable changing, some 
observers, then, argue that this phenomenon was, for the first time, 
ever happening during the Indonesian history (Colin MacAndrew, 
1993: 17). 
Decentralisation policy as one part of political development 
undoubtedly has to be compatible to that development ideology. 
Specifically, it can be argued that the concept of decentralisation 
in Indonesia at that time has to be suitable for Political Stability, 
Economic Growth, and Equity (even if it is just hypocritically 
speaking). However, among those three basic values of the ‘Trilogi 
Pembangunan’, the nature of Political Stability seems to be the core 
issue. The term political stability has been related to almost all of the 
development activities in order to legitimate the government action, 
even in the form of coercions that are taken by the state power. What 
is actually the determination of ‘political stability’ here? Indeed, 
at that time, there was no a specific operational definition of the 
term ‘political stability’ in the context of the ‘Trilogi Pembangunan’. 
The New Order seems to be more comfortable with a vagueness of 
definition. However, Michael Morfit (1986) has tried to formulate 
the definition of the word stability as ‘political order’, and this is, 
in turn, the establishment of a strong national government capable 
of exercising effective authority throughout the archipelago with its 
widely divergent social, cultural and environmental characteristics.
How has the Development Ideology of the New Order effected 
the implementation of decentralisation policy? According to the 
Basic Law Number 5 of 1974 (Undang-Undang tentang Pokok-Pokok 
Pemerintahan Di Daerah, Nomor 5 Tahun 1974), it states clearly 
that decentralisation means the transfer of authorities from central 
government to the first level of local government (Daerah Tingkat 
I), or from Daerah Tingkat I to the second level of local government 
(Daerah Tingkat II). This means to imply that local government 
in Indonesia is ‘Daerah Tingkat I’ and ‘Daerah Tingkat II’, and 
therefore they possess the authority to deliver their own regulations, 
especially in the case of government affairs which have already been 
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However, this worthwhile concept becomes obscure when it 
is tracked further in the Clarification of Basic Law Number No. 5 
of 1974 (Penjelasan Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1974). Some 
articles of Basic Law No. 5, 1974 clarification have demonstrated 
how the development ideology of the New Order has undermined 
the concept of decentralisation in Indonesia. In point 1.d, for 
instance, it states clearly that the decentralisation of authorities 
to local government is based on basic principles—to accelerate 
the implementation of development in local areas, and to establish 
political stability and national Unity. Therefore, central-local 
relationships must be conducted on a basis of a sense for unitary 
state. Decentralised authorities to local government, however, must 
stand  on the consideration that local government evidently possesses 
a great ‘responsibility’ to govern its household (in Indonesian the 
term is called Otonomi yang nyata dan bertanggung jawab). 
What are the specifics characteristics of ‘responsibility’ here? 
There is not an appropriate formulation which has being created for 
assessing the degree of local government ‘responsibility’. Due to this 
condition, the New Order appears to be more flexible to preserve its 
development ideology over the implementation of decentraliSation 
policy. The words ‘responsibility’, to some extent, can be utilised 
to legitimate whether decentralisation policy will be extended or, 
withdrawn.
Furthermore, with a view to carry out the implementation 
of decentralisation at the local level, it was also accompanied by 
a significant reform in local government institutions. In 1974, 
for instance, the Local Development Board (BAPPEDA) was 
established. The major function of this institution is to formulate 
local development plans (REPELITA-Daerah) and to coordinate all 
of the projects implementation at the local level. However, Michael 
Morfit (1986) pointed out that in fact, the ‘REPELITA-Daerah’ 
is formulated after the National Development Plan (REPELITA-
Nasional) was completed by the National Development Board 
(BAPPENAS). It means, what the BAPPEDA does, not more than 
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just translating the ‘REPELITA-Nasional’ into ‘REPELITA-Daerah’, 
rather than to articulate and formulate the proper development 
plans for its region. Likewise, in the case of the BAPPEDA’s second 
function. Through this function, the BAPPEDA is supposed to be 
able to coordinate the implementation of all projects in local areas. 
But the BAPPEDA has no authority to control the national project 
in its territory. Most of the project execution is handled by central 
government agencies in the regions. 
Other factor which has led to undermine the existence of 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia according to Morfit (1986) is 
financial and resources problems. Morfit demonstrated that there 
is a great imbalance between the local development budget and its 
financial capability. Thereby, it appears to be necessary for central 
government to sustain the allocation of national budget to local 
areas. During the 1978/1979s, the average percentage of national 
subsidy to local government stood at nearly 80% per annum. By 
this condition, it can be implied that increasing central government 
funding means increasing its control over the implementation of 
programmes.
To have more elaborative perspective on the nature of 
decentralisation during the New Order period, it is worthy to unfold 
the work of Dorodjatun Kuntjara Jakti (1981). He is one of the 
scholars who explored the implementation of decentralisation during 
the New Order period based on political economy perspective. The 
root of his argument is that the implementation of decentralisation 
in Indonesia, particularly during the New Order period, deteriorated 
because of the problem of regional imbalance. The New Order, 
according to Kuntjara Jakti, had introduced a combination of 
overwhelming control over the military and bureaucracy, as well as 
the growing resource base. Through this strategy, the New Order 
has been able to overcome the problem of regional imbalance and 
to eliminate the politically sensitive issue of regional autonomy 
(1981:133).
In the locus of his analysis, Kuntjara Jakti seems to agree with 
the idea that the implementation of decentralisation during the New 
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between the Ideological and Technical Orientation (citing Maryanov’s 
term). Ideologically, the notion of decentralisation is needed with 
a view to channel the development program to the local level and 
to elicit political support, either from people or from international 
communities. However, technically, the idea of decentralisation 
appears to be undesirable, because it seems to increase the tension of 
political instability.
Like Legge (1963) and Maryanov (1959), Kuntjara Jakti also 
suggests that the decentralisation policy during the New Order period 
had swung from one extreme of a more or less decentralised and 
democratic system to another of a highly centralised and autocratic 
one. According to Kuntjara Jakti, there are at least two crucial reasons 
for why the New Order regime inclined to centralise the political 
power in its hands. Politically, it had a close relationship with the 
issue of ‘national resilience’ (ketahanan nasional). Economically, it has 
attached to the neo-Keynesian model which is used by technocrats to 
map out the economic development. This technocratic model, thus, 
eventually led to the requirement of a centralised system (Kuntjara 
Jakti, 1981:143-144).
There were several methods implemented by the New Order 
to exercise its centralisation of power. In terms of controlling local 
governments, for instance, Kuntjara Jakti (1981:145) outlines,
In many cases the New Order was able to achieve this power (a 
centralized power) vis-à-vis the regions essentially by continuing 
the policies of Guided Democracy. With respect to regional 
leadership, for instance, the regime maintained the ‘Panca 
Tunggal’ system (five leaderships at the regional level which 
consists of the regional head, military commander, police 
chief, prosecutor, and regional council chairman) which it now 
renamed MUSPIDA (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah or Council 
of Regional Leadership). For Regional Council (DPRD), it 
maintained the system of appointment and screening and 
selected candidates from non-government parties. 
The ability of the military to create the long-dreamed-of 
command system, embracing all branches of the armed force 
as well as regional levels down to the lowest village units, and 
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to penetrate all branches and levels of government under the 
umbrella of a ‘dual function’ (Dwi Fungsi) doctrine, and so 
on; all of this gave the central regime power unequalled in 
Indonesia’s political history (1981:145).
A growing allocation of resources base, Kuntjara Jakti states, is 
also another method that had been employed by the New Order to 
maintain its centralisation system. This method had been performed 
by introducing a central budget allocation to regional areas. The 
strategy began with introducing the ADO scheme in 1967 (ADO 
means Alokasi Devisa Otomatis, or automatic foreign exchange 
allocation). Later on, in the early part of 1969, ADO was replaced by 
SPP-ADO (Sumbangan Pemerintah Pengganti ADO). Finally, since 
the middle of 1974, the New Order has introduced a ‘subsidy’ policy 
as the new form of national budget allocation to the local level. 
Paralleling this subsidy policy, the New Order also created another 
form of centralised regional redistribution scheme which is called 
Inpres Programme (Instruksi Presiden or the President Instruction 
Programme). 
Overall, Kuntjara Jakti argues that this circumstance has resulted 
in strengthening the local dependency on central government. The 
Inpres Programme, to some extent, had functioned as a means of by-
passing the legislature’s decision-making process and as a means of 
undercutting the powers remaining to regional government over the 
lower units (1981:152). The New Order’s attempt to centralise the 
economic policy has become more obvious since it was translated into 
a new formal structure in the early of 1974. This phenomenon can be 
viewed, for instance, through the establishment of the IRJENBANG 
(Inspectorate General for Development), BKPMD (Badan Koordinasi 
Penanaman Modal Daerah, Coordinating Body for Regional 
Investment) and the Bappeda (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah, Regional Development Planning Board).
Kuntjara Jakti’s study has contributed a great deal to 
decentralisation studies in Indonesia, because he is one of the scholars 
and perhaps the first author who has seen the implementation of 
decentralisation in Indonesia from a political economic perspective. 
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that the issue of ‘regional imbalance’ has encouraged the central 
government to strengthen its control over local governments. It can 
be argued, however, that the regional imbalance issue may also lead 
central government to having some difficulties in monopolising the 
political power, which eventually allows decentralisation to be more 
flexible in practice. 
IV. Post Suharto’s New Order Regime?
The authoritarian New Order government lasted for 32 years 
when Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998, after 12 months 
of political and economic turbulence, with intense regional conflicts 
and demands for a revised balance of power between centre and 
regions. There were four inter-linked processes that created the new 
framework for more democratic local institutions. First, a process 
towards a genuine devolution of public services and power to local 
governments was set in motion with the design of the laws to be 
described below. Authority over government services and functions 
has been devolved to the district and city level, and the new legislation 
mandates elected and empowered municipal, district and village 
councils. Second, the new government is searching for innovations 
in providing services to the public. People and politicians alike 
have increasingly understood that the present centralised system is 
awkward, prone to corruption, and not sustainable in the long term, 
and that wide-ranging reforms are necessary. Third, popular demands 
for fundamental governance reforms have rapidly moved outside 
Jakarta. Village heads and sub-district and district chairs have been 
forced to resign, replaced by leaders who are more responsive. Fourth, 
social activists have developed new approaches to direct engagement 
with local bureaucracies which are now being used to encourage 
more transparent and accountable local government, for instance in 
monitoring development projects and local budgets.
The wave of “political reform” following the step-down of 
Suharto on 21 May 1998 appears to have pulled Indonesian political 
history towards a more democratic political system. Moreover, central 
government’s effort to reform Local Government Law (Undang-
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Undang No. 5 Tahun 1974) to become Undang-Undang No. 22 
Tahun 1999 seems to have likewise  offered a number of promises 
to local governments for having a better future. However, it is also 
possible to conceive a number of telling factors which could, directly 
or indirectly, threaten the attainment of those expectations. One line 
of argument is related to the practice of so called KKN (Corruption, 
Collusion, and Nepotism) at the local level.  
There are several reasons why Indonesia eventually decided to 
reform its decentralisation and regional autonomy policies. The first 
is for democratisation, recognising that national democratisation 
cannot be sustained any longer without taking into account the 
similar need at the local level. The second is to make service delivery 
more efficient by de-bureaucratizing and giving direct authority to 
the agencies providers. The third, decentralisation is expected to 
build trust upon the government, and establish the more direct, 
immediate and productive government by encouraging people to 
become involved in the political priorities, and stimulating greater 
accountability and demands for more efficient public service.
On the other hand, the fact that central government’s financial 
capacity has decreased dramatically following the economic crisis 
since the late 1997 seemed to have been undeniable.   This is, 
indeed, another telling factor for the central government reformed 
the  decentralisation and regional autonomy policies. During the 
Suharto’s New Order, central government’s budget allocation for 
the local governments became one of the tactics to calm-down the 
regional disillusions upon central government, and even to “lock-off” 
the re-emergence of regional movements that took place in the late 
1950s. The form of national budget allocation  was quite various, 
arranged from Routine and Development budgets up to the so called 
Inpres (Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instructions). 
The disaster of economic crisis which took place by the end 
of the Suharto’s New Order has undeniably dismantled the central 
government’s financial capacity. Those who have governed Indonesia 
during the post Suharto regime seemed to have fully understood this 
situation. In other words, the post Suharto government recognises that 
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allocation” as a political tool to silence regional dissatisfactions. It is, 
perhaps, in this context, the wave for decentralisation policy reform 
introduced by the Post-Suharto government has also brought with it 
the central government’s own hidden agenda, which is to transfer its 
financial burdens to the regions.
Law No. 22 and 25 of 1999 were introduced to replace the 
previous New Order’s local government law No. 5 of 1974. 
Conceptually, one could point to those new established laws as a 
“big-bang” political reform taken by Indonesia to rearrange the 
nature of central-local government’s relationship. Law No. 22 of 1999 
has endeavoured to break through the long tradition of centralised 
power in the centre towards more decentralised power to the regions. 
Meanwhile, Law No. 25 of 1999 has brought a new formula for 
a balance fund between central and local governments. This new 
formula is called Dana Perimbangan Pusat-Daerah (Central-Local 
Government Balance Fund).
Just to point out a view examples, Law No. 22 of 1999’s desire to 
swing the pendulum of centralisation towards more decentralisation 
is clearly indicated by, for instance, the definition of decentralisation 
itself which says: decentralisation is the transfer of central government 
authorities to the autonomous local governments [regions] within the 
framework of a unitary state of Indonesia (see Article 1.e). When it is 
compared to the previous Law (Law No. 5 of 1974), it was stated that 
decentralization is the transfer of such governmental affairs [technical 
matters] from central to local governments within the framework of a 
unitary state of Indonesia. 
The definition stated in article 1.e, Law No. 22 of 1999 becomes 
more transparent when article 7 deals with outlining the concept 
of central-local government’s power relationship. Briefly, it is stated 
that: local governments’ authorities cover all of governmental authorities, 
unless that of the authorities in: foreign politic, defend and security, 
judiciary, fiscal and monetary, religious affairs, and other authorities (see 
article 7.1.). The point which should be emphasised here is the fact 
that, at the conceptual level, Law No. 22 of 1999 has endeavoured 
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to limit central government’s power only to that of five authorities 
(foreign politics, defence and security, judiciary, fiscal and monetary, 
religious affairs). Although, central government still assumed “other 
authorities” as stated at the end of article 7.1, and this has engendered 
a controversial opinion among scholars, I would like to argue that 
central government does need that of “other authorities”. The debate 
here is not questioning the existence of the central government’s 
other authorities; it is more on questioning the ways in which the 
authorities must be determined. Ideally, that central government’s 
other authorities should be decided on the basis of bargaining and 
negotiation between central and local governments. In other words, 
it must not be unilaterally decided by central government.
Another distinctive feature of Law No. 22 of 1999  is that it 
attempts to create more balance of power between Pemerintah 
Daerah  (Local Executive Body) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah (Local Representative Body, DPRD). While in the previous 
Law (law No. 5 of 1974), DPRD was given the status as  part of the 
pemerintah daerah, it is now by Law No. 22 of 1999 the DPRD has 
been separated from the pemerintah daerah, and has legal-formally 
been assigned  the status as local legislative body. The evidence for this 
is clearly indicated by, for instance, article 14 of Law No. 22 of 1999 
which says: in each local government there is a DPRD as the “Badan 
Legislatif Daerah” (Local Legislative Body), and a Pemerintah Daerah 
as the “Badan Eksekutif Daerah” (Local Executive Body). To clarify 
the function of the DPRD, article 18, then, goes further outlining a 
number of tasks and authorities assigned to this institution. Amongst 
other things are: to elect the local government heads (Governor and 
Vice Governor; District Head and Vice District Head; Mayor and 
Vice Mayor); to initiate the draft for local regulations; to approve all 
local regulations; to assess and to approve the local annual budget 
proposed by the local executive body, and to undertake supervision 
over the local executive body in exercising day-to-day government.
Last, but not the least important feature of Law No. 22 of 
1999, is that it attempts to shift the dominance role of provincial 
government over the district and municipality governments by 
defining the territorial status for both district and municipality 
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to this arrangement as a fundamental changing that has taken place 
in the process of local governments’ reform in Indonesia. It is mainly 
because the notion of giving fully autonomous local government 
status to both district and municipality governments seemed to have 
never appeared in the print, especially since the introduction of the 
Sukarno’s Guided-Democracy in the early 1960s following by the 
Suharto’s New Order. Although, for instance, in Law No. 5 of 1974, 
it was stated that the exercise of an autonomous local government 
was emphasised at district and municipality levels, but these local 
governments were still awarded a dual-status, namely: daerah 
otonom dan daerah administratif (autonomous and administrative 
territories). The autonomous territory here means the geographical 
setting for which decentralisation policies are performed. Meanwhile, 
the administrative territory means the geographical frame for the 
deconcentration policies. Law No. 22 of 1999, then, has endeavoured 
to end that of an “ambivalence concept” by giving a single status to 
district and municipality governments, namely, autonomous local 
government. To strengthen the position of district and municipality 
governments vis-à-vis provincial government, it is asserted in the 
article 4 (2) of Law No. 22 of 1999 that: provincial government [on 
the one hand], and district and municipality governments [on the 
other hand] are self-government which is not having a hierarchical 
relation to each other.
Meanwhile, Law No. 22 of 1999 has dealt more in outlining 
the concept of central-local government’s power relationship, Law 
No. 25 of 1999 has devoted more sketching the concept of central-
local government’s financial relationship. As mentioned by Hidayat 
(2000), the gist of Law No. 25 of 1999 when compared to the 
previous laws, is that it brings a new formula for local government 
revenue, the so-called Dana Perimbangan Pusat-Daerah (Central-
Local Government Balance Fund). Indeed, the notion of the Dana 
Perimbangan Pusat-Daerah itself is not something new for Indonesia, 
because it had ever been discussed in the 1950s, and was even put 
in print through Law No. 32 of 1956. However, this law was not 
taken into practice yet due to a number of reasons. Amongst other 
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things, its enactment coincided with circumstances through which 
the tension of conflict between central and local government was 
still at its peak, and which in subsequent years resulted in open 
regional movements (Legge, 1963:60). Law No. 25 of 1999, then, 
has endeavoured to bring that of a “suspended concept” into reality. 
Specifically, it is stated in article 3 of    Law No. 25 of 1999 
that: the sources of local government revenue are: Pendapatan Asli 
Daerah, PAD (Local Government Own Income), Dana Perimbangan 
(Central-Local Government Balance Fund), Pinjaman Daerah (Local 
Loan), and Lain-Lain Penerimaan yang Syah (Other legal revenues). 
The local own income (PAD) consists of local taxes, user chargers, 
revenue from local government’s own companies (Badan Usaha 
Milik Daerah, BUMD), and other legal local revenues (see Article 4). 
While central-local balance fund  consists of  revenues from land and 
constructional taxes, revenue sharing from natural resources, general 
allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU), and specific allocation 
fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK)(see Article 6). 
Furthermore, Article 7 of Law No. 25 of 1999 states that the 
general allocation fund (DAU) is determined at least to be about 25 
per cent of local revenue based on the national budget. This general 
allocation fund is divided into two, namely, general allocation 
fund for province and general allocation fund for district level. The 
proportion of general allocation fund for province is about 10 per 
cent, whereas for district level is about 90 percent of the total general 
allocation fund. 
Unlike the general allocation fund, a specific allocation fund 
(DAK) is allocated from national budget to the region to assist specific 
needs based on the availability of the funds in the national budget. 
The specific needs are defined as needs that cannot be estimated 
from the formula in the general allocation funds (DAU); and/or the 
needs that were committed to national priorities. It includes funds 
generated from reforestation fund.
Local borrowings can only be undertaken from domestic sources 
but not from overseas. However, if a local government intends to 
borrow money from overseas, they consequently have to do that 
Bringing the Power Back in: Insight into the Puzzle ...
144 through the central government. Long term borrowings can also be 
undertaken by the local government from domestic financial sources. 
These borrowings can only be used for funding  infrastructure 
development in the regions.  The development of the infrastructure 
is expected to result capital benefit to repay back the loan and it 
is also expected to benefit the public in the regions. Similarly, the 
short term borrowings can also be undertaken by local governments. 
However, these borrowings should be used for maintaining current 
cash flows for local financing. All of these borrowings have to be 
approved by the Regional Representative Body (DPRD). Note that 
the local governments are not allowed to borrow any loans larger 
than the amount of loan decided by the central government.   In 
addition, a local government is not allowed to make bail agreement 
that may impose regional financial sources.
One of the dangers with the practice of Law No. 22 of 1999 
is that local governments seem to have excessively exercised their 
decentralised authorities. In Indonesian terms, this tendency has 
been called as otonomi kebablasan (excessive autonomy). For those 
who subscribe to this perspective usually point to the fact that 
regional autonomy   has, in many cases, been translated by local 
governments as a freedom to conduct whatever they wish to do. 
Among the evidence mentioned to prove this phenomenon are the 
overwhelming manner of the DPRD in performing its supervision 
authority; and the mushrooming of local regulations (Peraturan 
Daerah/Perda) for revenue raising. 
The DPRD has been assigned a number of authorities; one of 
them is the authority to supervise the pemerintah daerah in conducting 
a day-to-day government. This is, indeed, a newly authority given to 
the DPRD, as it was never apparent in the previous laws, especially 
in Law No. 5 of 1974. By equipping the DPRD with that of 
supervision authority, it is expected that there will be a check and 
balances of power between the local executive and legislative bodies. 
However, in practical term, the DPRD seems to have over-reacted in 
exercising its supervision authority. This institution has, somehow, 
not only limited itself in supervising the ways in which such policy 
was performed by the local executive body, but also has gone further 
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to investigate such technical matters, for example, questioning the 
type of wood using for a building, the price for Air Conditioning, 
and so forth. 
On top of that, Hidayat’s study (2002) in Riau province indicates 
that   the DPRD has, in fact, employed its supervision authority as 
a ‘weapon’ for pushing through its annual budget vis-à-vis the local 
executive body. Amongst the raising argument asserted to justify this 
phenomenon is due to an unclear “rules of the game”. Law No. 
22 of 1999 brings the notion to empower   the DPRD by giving 
this institution three major functions, so called, the fungsi legislasi 
(legislature function), the   fungsi anggaran (budgetary function), 
and the fungsi pengawasan (supervising function). However, the 
assignment of these functions has not been supported by a clear-cut 
guidance which determines specifically both the forms and the scope 
of each function. This situation is to become worst by the fact, as we 
delineated in the preceding discussion,  that many members of the 
DPRD are newcomers who do not have much governance skills. 
Elsewhere, from the local executive the camp, amongst the 
evidence quoted to show the practice of so called otonomi kebablasan 
is  the mushrooming of local regulations (Peraturan Daerah) 
introduced by the pemerintah daerah for revenue raising, either in 
the form of local taxes (Pejak Daerah), or in the form of user chargers 
(Retribusi Daerah). Those who are sceptical to this tendency often 
use the terms “autonomy is auto-money” to label the behaviour of 
the pemerintah daerah in implementing regional autonomy policy. 
Hari Susanto’s study (2002), for instance, seems to have strongly 
proved the above proposition. It is asserted that the majority of 
local   officials interviewed in the research site (East Kalimantan) 
have a feeling that regional autonomy means the freedom assumed 
by local governments in both making and implementing decisions, 
including the freedom to decide and to enact such peraturan daerah 
for revenue raising. As a result, it is not surprising that one of the 
district governments in East Kalimantan province had introduced 
numerous local government regulations, and most of these newly 
created regulations are directed to generate local revenue. Amongst 
other things are: retribusi penggunaan jalan (users charge for using a 
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(timber production tax), pajak kendaraan (vehicle tax), and so forth.
Indeed, one should not be surprised by the practice of that 
so-called Otonomi Kebablasan  since as asserted by Hidayat (1999), 
the feature of  Indonesian decentralisation policy on its day-to-day 
basis is far more complex than the scholarly literature on the subject 
suggests; it involves more bargaining and coalition-building among 
both state and society actors at the local level. Indeed, the tightening 
grip of the central government’s control over the region has not 
necessarily limited the opportunity for local state elites to enjoy more 
autonomy in determining their own interests. 
The key to understanding this phenomenon, Hidayat (1999) 
argues, lies in the ‘relative capacity’ of local state elites to make 
autonomous choices.  The telling factors which explain the capacity 
of local state elites to exercise that autonomous choices is their access 
to accumulated political resources. Amongst other things are their 
skill in re-interpreting central government policies; knowledge of 
the local problems; alliances with particular societal groups; and 
individual connection with central state elites. If this argument makes 
sense, it is now clear enough that the conflicting nature of central 
government policies and the dominance of Indonesian bureaucratic 
patrimonilism have partly contributed to the shaping of local state 
elites’ capacity to exercise that of autonomous choices. 
Hidayat’s study (2001) in three of Indonesia’s provinces (West 
Java, South Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan) seems to support his 
previous findings as delineated above. To outline briefly, the study 
indicates that the practice of local state elites’ autonomous choices 
in both making and implementing local policies remains exist, and 
even becomes worse. In other words, the enactment of   Law No. 22 
and 25 of 1999 has, somehow, widened the room for local state elites 
to pursue both public and their own individual goals. Within this 
condition, the implementation of decentralisation, has much more 
been characterised by bargaining and coalition-building among local 
state elites. And it is undeniable that the decision making processes 
also tend to be concentrated in the hand of a few people, especially 
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those who assume the power in pemerintah daerah and the DPRD. 
The arguments stated by local state elites to justify their attitude 
are quite intriguing. Hidayat’s   study (2001) suggests that the un-
clear features of  Laws, the delay in issuance the  central government 
regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah),   and bringing the local 
community demands, have become the main arguments asserted by 
local state elites to rationalise such discretion they made in exercising 
local government decentralised authorities. The point which should 
be underlined here is the fact that the conflicting features of  Laws, 
the delaying of central government regulations, and the opining 
channel for society participation have, somehow, been manipulated 
by local state elites to justify their attitude in keep practicing of that 
the so called autonomous choices to make and implement local 
government.
Since mid-2002 (approximately one year after the 
implementation of Law no. 22 of 1999), discussion concerning 
decentralisation and regional autonomy policies in Indonesia begin 
to focus on contesting the reality of so called “excessive autonomy” 
(otonomi kebablasan) and “half-hearted autonomy” (otonomi setengah 
hati). The polemics  then start to conical in early 2003, due to a 
common ground of understanding between the parties involved 
about the need to revise the Law No. 22 of 1999 as soon as possible. 
In other words, the revision Law No. 22 of 1999 has been articulated 
as the most efficacious therapy to end the practice of that so called 
“excessive and “half-hearted autonomy”.
Ironically, and  it was impressed, as most of  scholars tend to 
agree, and seemed to lose their academic sensitivity in scrutinising 
the implied meaning and the implicit goals behind that of 
“excessive” and  “half-hearted” autonomy  terminologies.  While 
the more fundamental issues, such as: whether the decentralisation 
policy in Indonesia (including policies set out in the Law No. 22 of 
1999) has been appropriate and in line with the basic concepts of 
decentralisation itself, relatively received no attention.
In entering the 2004, debate on the revision of Law No. 22 of 
1999, in particular, tend to subside, or even nearly disappeared from 
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grand agenda, namely the presidential direct election (Pemilihan 
Presiden Secara Langsung). However, along with the election of SBY-
Kalla as president and vice president, and no longer end of Mega-
Hamzah leadership, in October 2004 central government along 
with the House of Representatives (DPR) approved the new local 
government laws (No. 32 and 33 of 2004) which subsequently 
replace the law No. 22 and 25 of 1999.
The presence of this new law had attracted a lot of criticism 
from observers. Among others mentioned that, from time dimension 
point of view (timing), the approval of Law. 32 and 33 of 2004 
seemed to have been part of political effort to maximise the rest of 
Mega-Hamzah leadership. Actually, the practice of that “stealing 
time” is not an unique matter in a day-to-day politic, because it has 
been well known that the essence of political practice are how to get, 
to use, and to sustain the power. On the basis of this understanding, 
the next discussion will no longer be focused on questioning the 
political rationality for the endorsement of Law No. 32 and 33 of 
2004, but rather the question of substance of the law, and examine 
the consequences resulted from its implementation.
Substantially, one of the most important changes that have 
been made through the Law No. 32 of 2004 is the introduction of a 
direct election for local government heads (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah 
Secara Langsung/Pilkada Langsung).  In order to bring into place 
that of constitutional mandate, central government has decided 
to immediately implement direct elections starting mid-2005. It 
is very understandable then this decision had also encouraged the 
appearance of controversial response. 
On the one hand, there are many people who have positively 
valued that of central government decision, especially in order to 
accelerate the process of democratisation at the local level, and to 
create an independent local government. But on the other hand, 
it is also not a few people who tend to be sceptical in appraising 
that of central government’s decision, particularly when associated 
with institutional readiness and preparedness of local communities 
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themselves to exercise  direct elections.
Regardless of the pros and cons in dealing with the above 
government’s policy to push through Pilkada Langsung, it is also 
important to examine one of the main elements of decentralisation 
concept itself, namely, setting central-local governments power 
relation. The question here is that  whether the arrangement of power 
relations between central and local governments in  the Law No. 
32 of 2004 has somehow  attempted to push  further the centralise 
power pendulum towards more decentralisation, as has been initiated 
by the Law No. 22 of 1999? Or vice versa, it leads to power “re-
centralisation”?
To get a specific answer to the above question, of course, 
requires a comprehensive evaluation over the substance of central-
local government’s power relation written in the law No. 32 of 2004. 
However, when we look at what has been stated in article 10 to 14, 
although it seems partial, one may easily notice that the spirit of 
power re-centralisation seems to have dominated the arrangement 
of central-local government’s power relationship. For example, in 
Article 10 (1) stated that local governments are assigned to exercise 
such government affairs that have become their authority, except 
for governmental affairs that by law belong to central  government. 
Furthermore, in Article 10 (3), affirmed that the authorities owned 
by central government include: Foreign Policy, Defence, Security, 
Justice, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, and Religion affair. At first 
glance, one may recognize the arrangement stated in that article 
10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 as an impressive improvement over the 
Article 7 (1) of Law No. 22 of 1999, and would likely promise a 
better decentralised authority to local governments.
However, the spirit of power relation reform above seemed to 
have been bland, or   even more impressive shades of re-centralisation 
when the Article 11 to 14 start putting some “political snares” to 
control local governments. In Article 11 (1), for example, noted 
that the execution of government authorities are divided based on 
the criteria of externality, accountability, by taking into account the 
harmonious relationship among the level of government hierarchies. 
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efficiency, they just been defined in general terms, and these  would 
certainly bring with a  potential for starring as “disguise hand” of the 
central government to limit and to control the local authorities. 
The “political trap” to limit the authority of local governments 
are increasingly affirmed in article 11, paragraph 4, which states: 
local government’s compulsory authorities are assigned in the basis of 
gradual process, and determined by central government. Meanwhile, 
the “optional authorities” (urusan pilihan) are assigned  to local 
governments (provincial and district/city) in the basis of which the 
authorities are significantly needed to increase social welfare, and by 
taking into consideration the characteristic and potency owned by 
each local government.
The question then, whether decentralisation policy reform in 
the post Suharto period, outlined above, can be regarded as part of 
the characteristic of a political system in the transition period towards 
democracy? It is realised that to be able to construct an appropriate 
theoretical answer to the above question, the discussion should include 
a wider context. I am also aware about the limitations of materials 
presented in this paper to be employed as the basis for putting 
forward a theoretical speculation. Without intending to conduct 
an academic simplification, however, I have believed that the data 
and information outline above is representative enough to cast light 
on the features of contemporary Indonesia’s decentralisation policy 
reform. Therefore, I would argue that although at a minimum level 
the material presented in this paper may be employed as the basis for 
developing such theoretical speculation regarding the characteristics 
of Indonesian decentralisation in a period the so called  “transition 
towards democracy”.
Theoretically, it is argued that the remaining dominant role 
of state actors, and   more chances for societal participation in the 
process of policy making and policy implementation are amongst 
the main features of a political system  in  transition  from an 
authoritarian political system towards a more  democratic political 
system.  Based on this theoretical understanding, I have proposed 
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three main characteristics of decentralisation in the transition towards 
democratic political system (Hidayat, 2003: 56-59).
The first is the dominant role of the central government in 
determining decentralisation policy tends to decrease. While during 
the authoritarian regime, the central government played a dominant 
role in determining the process of policy making, in the transition 
towards democracy, this dominant role tends to decrease because 
the demands coming from local governments and their community 
must be taken into consideration in the process of policy making 
(Hidayat, 2003: 56). It is important to note that the decreasing role 
of the central government here is likely to be evident in quantitative 
dimensions. It implies that qualitatively speaking, the central 
government remains able to push through its interests, although it 
was done on the basis of  democratic mechanism; and it has more 
been channelled through the informal political process rather than a 
formal mechanism.
Field of conflict, in addition, is usually taking place in the context 
of power division between the central and local governments. On the 
one hand, the demand for political reform has called for dispersing 
as much as possible the power and authority to local governments. 
On the other hand, the central government remains reluctant to 
lose its power over local governments. In contemporary Indonesia, 
this conflict of interest has been reflected by the emergence of the 
so-called Otonomi Daerah Setengah Hati (half-hearted regional 
autonomy) phenomenon. To win the competition, and to cool down 
the region dissatisfaction, amongst the instruments which  is often 
employed by the central government is the resource base allocation, 
such as, by gushing central government’s fund, and others subsidies 
to the local governments.
The second characteristic of decentralisation and regional 
autonomy practices in the transition towards democracy is the 
shifting nature of the approach to policy implementation (Hidayat, 
2003: 58). The “old approach” which was developed on the basis of 
a monolithic perspective and dominated by the top-down spirit, is 
gradually shifting towards, a “new approach” which is constructed 
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spirit of bottom-up. Theoretically, this shift in approach to policy 
implementation might lead to two conflicting consequences. On the 
one hand, it will allow local governments to assume more autonomy 
in both making and implementing their decisions, as long as this 
autonomy does not go beyond the scope of their decentralised 
authorities, and does not contradict the national interests. On the 
other hand, when the shift in approach to policy implementation is 
not followed by the changing orientation and attitude among local 
state elites, it will lead to an ambivalent orientation towards the policy 
itself.
In Indonesia today, the emergence of the so called Otonomi 
Daerah Kebablasan (excessive regional autonomy) may be seen as 
one logical consequence of that ambivalent orientation towards the 
implementation of decentralisation policy.  At the practical level, 
this local state elites’ ambivalent orientation has been reflected by 
the attitude of local government officials which tend to position 
the central government as the major source of both political and 
economic energies needed. On the other hand, they also seem to 
have resisted, or even refused, central government’s interventions on 
authorities that have been defined as to belong to each individual local 
government. It is, amongst other thing, the theoretical explanation 
for understanding the so called Perda Bermasalah (miss-introduced 
Local Government Regulations) which is taking place in Indonesia 
today.
The third characteristic of decentralisation and regional 
autonomy practices in transition towards democracy is that society 
is not fully excluded from the implementation of decentralisation 
anymore (Hidayat, 2003: 59). They have hitherto been allowed to 
participate in both policy-making and implementation at the local 
government level. However, the involvement of society, in addition, 
is much more represented by a few of societal elites who usually 
act on behalf of civil society, and claim themselves as representing 
societal interests. In more specific terms, it may be argued that the 
inclusion of society, in this sense, does not take the form of “popular 
participation” yet, but is more likely in the form of societal elites’ 
153
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
participation. It means that, in essence, the pattern of state-society 
relationship in the implementation of decentralisation and regional 
autonomy policies is more characterised by an interaction between 
local state elites and societal elites. Therefore, it is undeniable that 
collusion and bargaining of interest among elites would become 
the prevailing features of the policy making process as well as policy 
implementation at local government level. 
V. Ideological vs Technical Orientation
This section attempts to pull together the main elements of 
the story presented above with a view to provide a comprehensive 
understanding on the subject of what does the paper tell us about the 
features of decentralised power to local governments in Indonesia.
In brief, it may be argued that the concept of decentralisation 
implemented in Indonesia since early independence has never 
completely referred to the political decentralization perspective, but 
is referred more to the administrative decentralization perspective. 
Thus, decentralisation policy which according to the central 
government is aimed at speeding up the democratisation process at 
the local level remains a statement rather than reality.  In fact, the 
autonomy that was given to local governments is very limited and 
tightly controlled by central government. Maryanov (1965) labelled 
this phenomenon as ideological versus technical orientation. This 
is, indeed, the core issue in understanding the puzzle of Indonesia’s 
decentralisation reform since its early independence up to now day. 
The introduction of Law No. 22 of 199 in the post Suharto 
regime had been valued by many scholars as a “big-bang” political 
reform taken by Indonesia to rearrange the structure of central-
local governments’ power relationship. This is mainly because it 
has endeavoured to break through the long tradition of centralised 
power in the centre towards more decentralized power to the regions. 
Another distinctive feature of Law No. 22 of 1999 is that it attempts 
to create more balance of power between Pemerintah Daerah (Local 
Executive Body) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local 
Representative Body, DPRD). One of the dangers with the practice 
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excessively exercised their decentralised authorities. In Indonesian 
terms, this tendency has been called as otonomi kebablasan (excessive 
autonomy), meaning to imply a “misconduct behaviour”. 
The existence of that local government misconduct behaviour 
is not a unique feature in the implementation of decentralisation 
and regional autonomy policies in Indonesia. My previous study 
(Hidayat, 1999: 303), for instance, pointed out that Indonesia’s 
decentralisation on a day-to-day basis is much more characterised 
by bargaining and coalition building between both state and society 
actors at the local level. The practice of regional autonomy policy 
with this kind of characteristic is much more in the form of “hidden” 
autonomy rather than formal (apparent) autonomy. The telling factor 
explains the capacity of local state elites to exercise that of “hidden” 
autonomy is their access to accumulate political resources. Amongst 
other things is their skill in re-interpreting central government 
policies; knowledge of local problems; alliances with particular 
societal groups; and individual connections with central state elites 
(Hidayat, 1999: 312).
The revision of Local Government Law No. 22 of 1999 to 
become Law No. 32 of 2004, amongst other thing, is part of a 
political quick response to that of so called otonomi kebablasan. As 
a consequence, it is not surprising when we look at the substance of 
Law no. 32 of 2004; one may easily notice that the spirit of power re-
centralisation seems to have dominated the arrangement of central-
local governments’ power relationship.
VI. Closing Remarks:
Local government has the potential to democratise because 
the decentralisation process allows for more responsiveness, 
representativeness and thus accountability. Decentralisation must 
simultaneously strengthen local capacity and build responsive 
governance systems (not only empower local governments, but also 
ensure that they are held accountable and deliver social services). 
However, the democratic potential of decentralisations is usually 
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greatest when it is linked with the institutionalisation of local level 
popular participation and community participation. Otherwise, in 
the absence of this linkage, decentralised authority may be hijacked 
by local elites as they are in power to steer benefits to themselves and 
their clients. Patterns of local strongmen, even warlords, can emerge. 
Antlöv (2002) puts his view in some more details that popular 
participation involves the systematic participation in decision 
formulation and taking by groups of citizens, of linking those who 
have developed participatory methods for consultation, planning 
and monitoring to the new governance agenda. Citizen participation 
can be driven by innovative and committed citizens demanding 
their voices to be heard. It can also be provided by state agencies as 
ways to overcome the distrust in government and to empower local 
communities. 
Overall, it may be argued that decentralisation is thus a 
necessary for meaningful local democracy but it must be linked 
with the institutionalisation of local level popular participation and 
community participation. Otherwise, decentralised authority will be 
hijacked by local elites to steer benefits to themselves and their clients. 
As we have learnt from the case of Indonesia, decentralisation policies 
in themselves do not promote good governance yet, as the stories 
above about mismanagement and power abuse attest to. It means to 
imply that Indonesian efforts to put into place an effective and more 
democratic state management still requires much improvement in 
the context of the day-to-day governance practices at the local level 
that encourage more citizen participation. 
Finally, I would like to cast light on a proposition which says: 
although the answer to the question of whether the Indonesian 
decentralisation and local autonomy policies have actually managed 
to save the nation-state is still contested, the  introduction of both 
concept and policy reforms in the post Suharto’s period have, to 
some extent, reduced the region dissatisfaction upon the centre, and 
have opened up the political space for citizen participation in policy 
making process, and in governing their own communities. What 
Indonesian should do in the near future is to put decentralisation 
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decentralisation process from the central government desire “to bring 
the power back in”.
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